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Abstract 
This paper updates the classic growth accounting research of the early 1980s taking account of 
improved data that has subsequently become available.  The picture of long-run growth which 
results from incorporating many revisions is considerably different.  The long-run path of 
productivity growth is now that of a roller-coaster with twin peaks in the third quarters of the 19th 
and 20th centuries rather than a U-shape.  Productivity growth appears to have been very slow to 
accelerate in the Industrial Revolution, the notion of an Edwardian climacteric is not persuasive and 
the current productivity slowdown stands out as unprecedented. 
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1. Introduction 
The publication of Matthews et al. (1982) was major landmark in the study of long-run British 
economic growth.  It was the first serious attempt to utilize growth accounting techniques as an 
integral part of the description of growth performance over the long run and provided estimates of 
the sources of growth covering the years 1856 to 1973.  It was accompanied by Feinstein (1981) 
which developed a similar analysis for 1760 to 1860, encompassing the era of ‘take-off’, and by 
Feinstein et al. (1982) which contained a detailed review of the so-called climacteric by looking at 
sub-periods within 1873-1913.  The overview which emerged was that productivity growth had 
followed a U-shape from the industrial revolution to the golden age with the bottom of the U in the 
early 20th century and the fastest total factor productivity growth in the early 19th century and in the 
golden age after World War II. 
Over subsequent years the data available for the construction of growth accounts has improved and 
expanded considerably although even now the foundations laid by Charles Feinstein’s remarkable 
scholarship underpin a good deal of what can be done.  Also, of course, we now know what followed 
the golden age and that adds a new perspective with the advantage of hindsight.  Major changes to 
the data include better estimates of GDP growth notably but not only for the industrial revolution 
period, improved estimates of capital inputs, and the opportunity to measure labour inputs entirely 
in terms of hours worked rather than headcount.  These and other refinements to the data have 
been compiled and quality assured in a new dataset produced at the Bank of England (Thomas and 
Dimsdale, 2017). 
This paper considers the picture of the sources of British economic growth that is embodied in the 
revised data and compares it with that derived from the earlier vintage.  It turns out that in total the 
data revisions make quite a big difference.  The main new results are as follows. 
First, both labour productivity growth and total factor productivity (TFP) growth were much lower 
during the industrial revolution than it appeared 40 years ago.  Slower productivity growth results 
from significant downward revisions to estimated real GDP growth and also from the development 
of estimates of hours worked which were not available to Feinstein. 
Second, the idea of an Edwardian climacteric identified by Feinstein et al. (1982) as characterizing 
the years 1899-1913 is much less persuasive than they believed.  Partly this is because the growth 
slowdown is less marked according to the new estimates.  But also it appears overshadowed by a 
bigger slowdown at the end of the ‘mid-Victorian boom’ in the 1870s, it pales into insignificance 
compared with recent experience since the financial crisis, and TFP growth in these years far 
exceeded anything seen during the classic industrial revolution period. 
Third, it is still possible to see a U-shaped pattern to TFP growth with the lowest point just before 
World War I but the starting point would be in the mid-19th century.  Overall, however, the shape 
over the long run now looks more like a rollercoaster in the light of the new view of the industrial 
revolution and the slowdown after the golden age.  Even so, the years between 1973 and 2007 
emerge as a period of relatively strong labour productivity growth by historical standards well ahead 
of almost all periods before World War II. 
2 
 
Fourth, real GDP growth, and to a slightly lesser extent productivity growth, are appreciably stronger 
in the years after World War II than previously thought.  This is mainly due to recent revisions to 
GDP estimates.  Although it modifies the detail, taking an internationally comparative perspective 
this leaves intact the idea of a British failure in these years of rapid catch-up growth since being 
overtaken by other European countries prior to 1973 is still apparent. 
Fifth, the decrease in productivity growth after 2007 is unprecedented in British economic history.  
This adds weight to the notion of the ‘productivity puzzle’, namely that in 2018 quarter 4, real GDP 
per hour worked was only 2.0 per cent above the pre-crisis peak level seen in 2007 quarter 4.  It 
would have been 22.3 per cent higher if pre-crisis trend growth had been sustained (ONS, 2019). The 
pre-crisis peak level of labour productivity was only surpassed in 2016 quarter 2.   
2. New Estimates for Growth Accounts 
As was noted above, over the past 40 years or so research has led to significant revisions in the data 
with which to construct growth accounting estimates both with regard to output and inputs.  These 
data have been assembled in Thomas and Dimsdale (2017).  In many ways they are still imperfect 
but the items reviewed here are improvements on what was previously available.  This section 
briefly reviews the main developments and notes their original sources. 
Several important revisions have been made to estimates of real GDP.  For the period prior to 1855, 
Broadberry et al. (2015) provide estimates built up from the output side.  These confirm the findings 
of Crafts (1985) and of Crafts and Harley (1992) that the earlier study by Deane and Cole (1962), 
which deflated estimates of nominal income for benchmark years by an inappropriate price index 
and on which Feinstein (1981) relied, significantly overestimated output growth during the early 19th 
century.  In fact, the new estimates by Broadberry et al. (2015) suggest that growth was even a bit 
slower than estimated by Crafts and Harley (1992) in the first three decades of the century. 
For the period from 1870 to 1948, the ‘balanced estimates’ made by Sefton and Weale (1995) and 
Solomou and Weale (1991) can now be used rather than the ‘compromise’ estimate of GDP 
favoured by Feinstein (1972).  Whereas the compromise approach is based on the geometric 
average of the expenditure, income and output estimates, the balanced approach weights the 
average according to the reliability of the different estimates.  This may give different results when 
the three series differ, as is notably the case for the decades before World War I.  The implication is 
that the growth slowdown of the early 20th century is less severe than Feinstein et al. (1982) 
believed. 
For the period since 1948, current ONS estimates are the preferred choice of Ryland and Thomas 
(2017).  For the period up to 1973, these show rather stronger growth than the series used by 
Matthews et al. (1982).  This is an outcome of recent revisions, notably a switch to using CPI rather 
than RPI to deflate nominal expenditures, as explained in Bank of England (2011). This adds about 
0.3 percentage points per year to GDP growth throughout 1948 to 1973.  In addition, a change in 
national accounting conventions means that R & D is now treated as final investment expenditure 
which adds about 0.15 percentage points to GDP growth in these years. 
Turning to inputs, new estimates are available for capital and estimates of labour inputs based on 
hours worked rather than headcount are feasible.  Feinstein (1988) updated his earlier estimates of 
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capital stocks for the period 1760 to 1856 which amongst other things put his earlier work for the 
industrial revolution period and his estimates for the later 19th century on a consistent basis.  For the 
period since 1950, estimates of capital inputs based on capital services are now available (Oulton 
and Wallis, 2016) which supersede the earlier estimates made on a capital stocks basis.1  Thomas 
and Dimsdale (2017) include a series for hours worked per year throughout the period covered by 
this paper which uses various sources to implement the basic methodology of Matthews et al. for 
1856-1973 on an annual basis which permits a new view of labour productivity during the so-called 
climacteric.  For the industrial-revolution period there are now several options available.  The best of 
these appears to be the series derived from the work of Humphries and Weisdorf (2019) in Thomas 
and Dimsdale (2017).  It is probably fair to say that estimates of hours worked should be regarded as 
not very reliable (Feinstein, 1998).2 
A significant weakness of the Thomas and Dimsdale (2017) dataset with regard to its use for growth 
accounting is that is does not contain estimates of labour quality which can be used to augment 
hours worked in arriving at labour input.  Matthews et al. (1982) did make estimates for benchmark 
years which were dominated by changes in education but they regarded their results with some 
caution.  Nevertheless, their estimates are still the best available for the years 1856 to 1973.3  Prior 
to that date, recent research by de Pleijt (2018) has provided estimates of years of schooling which 
can be used as the basis for an (incomplete) index of labour quality using the same assumption as 
Matthews et al. (1982) about the return to educational attainment.4  For the years since 1975, better 
estimates are available using a modern methodology where labour quality growth is the difference 
between the rate of growth of compensation-weighted labour inputs and that of hours worked (Bell 
et al., 2005; ONS, 2017).5 
Matthews et al. (1982) used a conventional (neoclassical) growth accounting methodology which is 
based on treating the economy as if it can be characterized by a Cobb-Douglas production function 
with constant returns to scale 
Y = AKL1 -                                                                                                                                               (1) 
where Y is output, K is capital, L is labour and A is total factor productivity (TFP) while  and (1  ) 
are the elasticities of output with respect to capital and labour, respectively. The basic growth 
accounting formula is 
                                                          
1 Capital inputs grow faster when measured in terms of capital services rather than capital stocks, especially in 
the ICT era.  The respective growth rates are 4.24 versus 4.02 in 1950-79, 3.85 versus 3.11 in 1979-2000, and 
3.40 versus 3.13 in 2000-13 (Oulton and Wallis, 2016). 
2 Alternative estimates for benchmark years in Voth (2001) show a considerable rise in hours worked between 
1760 and 1800 and would imply negative labour productivity growth in that period. 
3 Matthews et al. (1982) took account of changes in the intensity of work arguing that shorter hours might be 
compensated by improved productivity of the remaining work time.  This assumption mainly affects the 
estimates for 1856 to 1873 which saw a notable fall in weekly hours.  The allowance that they made is 
‘arbitrary’, as they admit, and is perhaps not what is usually understood by ‘labour quality’. Most growth 
accounting studies prefer to leave any such effects in the residual. 
4 This entails assuming a 6 per cent increase in labour quality per year of schooling.  Alternative estimates for 
‘skills per worker’ growth can be found in Williamson (1985). These give quite similar results to the labour 
quality growth reported in Table 3. 
5 Education accounts for a large share of labour quality growth throughout the 20th century on these 
estimates:  77% in 1924-37, 65% in 1950-73, 95% in 1980-1990 and 89% in 1990-2002. 
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ΔY/Y = αΔK/K + (1 – α)ΔL/L + ΔA/A                                                                                                       (2) 
This can be re-written in terms of the rate of growth of labour productivity as 
ln(Y/L)  =  ln(K/L) +  lnA                                                                                                                 (3) 
where the first term represents the contribution of capital deepening.  The output elasticity, α, is 
assumed to equal the share of profits in national income. 
Adapting this equation to take account of labour quality as a component of labour input gives the 
expression 
Δln(Y/L) = αΔln(K/L) + (I – α)Δln(LQ/L) + ΔA/A                                                                                    (4) 
This approach is also applied to the modern data in what follows.  Equations (2) and (3) are used to 
produce Tables 1 and 2 while equation (4) is the basis for Table 3.  Part a) of Table 1 summarizes the 
early vintage of growth accounting estimates using the periodization favoured by the authors but 
excluding the episodes of the World Wars.  This table reports ‘crude’ TFP growth which treats labour 
input in terms of quantity while disregarding quality.  Part b) maintains this design but extends the 
coverage back to 1700 and forward to 2016.  Table 2 focuses on the treatment of the ‘climacteric’ in 
Feinstein et al. (1982) which considered growth accounts for business-cycle peak to business-cycle 
peak and again reports both the original estimates and estimates using modern data.  Estimates of 
labour quality growth are not available for this periodization so the discussion of the climacteric is 
based on crude TFP growth. Table 3 takes account of labour quality by including it in labour input 
which results in lower TFP growth other than in the late 18th century.  This was the preferred 
approach in Matthews et al. (1982) but estimates of labour quality growth were not made by 
Feinstein (1981) for the period before 1856 or by Feinstein et al. (1982) for sub-periods within 1873 
to 1913. 
3. Two Vintages of Estimates Compared 
This section considers how far growth accounting estimates change if the modern data discussed in 
section 2 are used.  The exposition seeks simply to itemize the main differences that emerge in 
Tables 1, 2 and 3 leaving discussion of the implications for the understanding of British growth 
performance to the following section. The comparisons are organized chronologically by reviewing 
four periods. 
The industrial revolution is the episode where the new estimates are most different from those of 40 
years ago.  As is reported in Table 1, labour productivity growth is now estimated to have been much 
lower throughout the classic industrial-revolution years (1760-1830) – by about 0.1 percent per year 
during 1760 to 1800 and 1 per cent per year between 1801 and 1830.  In the new estimates, TFP 
growth is much lower during 1801-1830 (0.19 per cent per year compared with 1.3 per cent).  The 
main reason for this is that output growth is now seen as much slower than was supposed by Deane 
and Cole (1962) on whose estimates Feinstein (1981) relied.  Taking account of labour quality based 
on years of schooling makes virtually no difference, as Table 3 shows. 
The central features of the Edwardian climacteric according to Feinstein et al. (1982) were a fall in 
real GDP growth from 2.1 per cent per year in 1873-1899 to 1.4 per cent per year in 1899-1913 
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accompanied by a decline in labour productivity growth from 1.2 to 0.5 per cent per year and in TFP 
growth from 0.7 to 0.0 per cent per year.  The new estimates based on hours worked rather than 
employment and on balanced rather than compromise GDP reported in Table 2 alter this picture 
quite considerably.  The slowdown is relatively mild with GDP growth, labour productivity growth, 
and TFP growth falling by 0.33, 0.34 and 0.39 per cent per year, respectively.  A key point to note is 
that the major fall in labour productivity growth occurs after 1873 (rather than after 1899) in the 
new estimates, from 2.06 per cent in 1856-1873 to 1.18 per cent per year in 1873-1899 which 
compares with 1.3 to 1.2 per cent per year in Feinstein et al. (1982).  This is almost entirely because 
they examined the climacteric in terms of output per worker rather than output per hour worked.6 
Matthews et al. (1982) saw the interwar period as the point at which British productivity 
performance started to bounce back from the low point of the early 20th century.  This view was 
predicated on their comparison of 1899 to 1913 with 1924 to 1937.  Table 2 shows a recovery of 
crude TFP growth and labour productivity growth from 0.0 to 0.6 per cent per year and 0.5 to 0.7 per 
cent per year, respectively.  The new estimates in Table 2 show a mixed picture with labour 
productivity growth slightly lower in 1924 to 1937 than 1899 to 1913 (0.70 versus 0.84 per cent per 
year) and a smaller improvement in TFP growth from 0.42 to 0.90 per cent per year.  On the other 
hand, TFP growth is higher in the new estimates in 1924 to 1937 (0.90 versus 0.6 per cent per year) 
since net (but not gross) capital deepening made a negative contribution to labour productivity 
growth.  Interestingly, however, the new, but not the old, estimates show faster TFP growth in the 
interwar period than in the first half of the 19th century. 
The ‘golden age’ after World War II was highlighted by Matthews et al. (1982) as the period when 
productivity growth was at an all-time high.  This is still the case in the new estimates; growth during 
the period was stronger with real GDP growth at 3.36 per cent per year in 1950-1973.  This pushes 
up TFP growth to 2.44 per cent per year compared with 2.1 per cent in the old estimates, TFP* 
growth from 1.7 to 1.88 per cent, and labour productivity growth from 3.3 per cent to 3.74 per cent 
per year, as reported in Tables 1 and 3.  The new estimates endorse the notion of an all-time high by 
confirming that productivity growth slowed down subsequent to the golden age. 
The U-shape in productivity growth highlighted by Matthews et al (1982) can still be seen but only 
by truncating the view at both ends.  Instead, the picture that captures the long run is that of a roller 
coaster with quite a long climb to the first peak in the mid-19th century with a spell in the doldrums 
before a second peak about a hundred years later followed by descent to the nadir (we hope!) of the 
last ten years. 
4. Implications 
This section considers what difference adopting the new growth accounting estimates set out above 
would make to the historiography of long-run British economic growth.  No doubt, further 
improvements to the dataset may be made and, quite possibly, different methods of growth 
                                                          
6 This was apparently because they only made estimates for hours worked for the benchmark years of 1856, 
1873 and 1913 and could only discuss sub-periods within 1873-1913 in terms of employment. A glance at 
Table 1 or Table 3 shows that a reader of Matthews et al. (1982), whose estimates used output per hour 
worked, would have thought that productivity growth fell sharply after 1873. 
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accounting may be preferred in future but it seems useful to take stock of the implications of this 
new vintage of estimates. 
With regard to growth during the industrial revolution, the new output growth estimates of 
Broadberry et al. (2015) broadly confirm the macroeconomic picture outlined by Crafts and Harley 
(1992).  They show slightly faster labour productivity growth through the period but nevertheless 
the story is still a slow acceleration of growth and no Rostovian take off.7  This may seem surprising if 
we see the industrial revolution as a period of dramatic technological progress but this only affected 
a relatively small part of the economy. It took a long time before steam power, the general purpose 
technology of the time, was developed to the point at which it had a significant impact; from 1760 to 
1830, Crafts (2004) estimated that steam raised labour productivity growth and TFP growth by 0.003 
and 0.014 percentage points per year, respectively.  So, there is already a reasonable explanation for 
‘slow’ productivity growth during the industrial revolution and the historiography has adjusted.   
The Edwardian climacteric was first proposed by Phelps-Brown and Handfield-Jones (1952) who saw 
it has a hiatus when the productivity impact of the steam-powered technologies of the first 
industrial revolution waned and that of the new technologies of the second industrial revolution, 
based on electricity, the internal combustion engine and chemicals, had yet to have much effect.  
This has remained a popular view among non-specialist economists, for example Lipsey et al. (1998) 
and the Deputy Governor of the Bank of England.8  However, it did not stand up well to quantitative 
scrutiny even on the basis of old vintage data; Crafts et al. (1989) estimated a time-varying trend 
model using a Kalman Filter methodology and found that the maximum decrease in trend GDP 
growth was from 2.03 per cent per year in 1899 to 1.88 per cent in 1908.9  Crafts and Mills (2004) 
showed that a reduced impact of steam was not a plausible explanation of slowing growth in the late 
19th century. 
The idea of the climacteric as promulgated by Feinstein et al. (1982) has been seen as connoting 
failure of the British economy at a time when it was being overtaken by the United States (Thomas, 
1988).  For those who take this view, the difference between crude TFP growth of 0.0 per cent per 
year between 1899 and 1913 in the old vintage estimates and 0.42 per cent per year in the new 
changes the detail but not the substance of the comparison.10  In any case, the salient feature is that 
Britain did not match the acceleration of American TFP growth from 0.4 per cent between 1855 to 
1890 to 1.3 per cent in 1890-1905 and 1.5 per cent in 1905-1927 (Abramovitz and David, 2001).  
Where the new estimates make most difference is in highlighting an earlier productivity slowdown in 
the 1870s which many years ago was alleged by Coppock (1956) and which now deserves more 
attention. 
Matthews et al. (1982) was notable for a more favourable view of economic performance during the 
interwar period than had been typical of traditional accounts.  The new estimates reinforce that 
                                                          
7 Broadberry et al. (2015) do present a revised picture of relative sectoral productivity growth rates based on 
new estimates of the sectoral allocation of employment.  The implications of this are reviewed in Crafts (2014). 
8 Ben Broadbent in a notorious interview with the Daily Telegraph in 2018 compared the current state of the 
economy with the sharp fall in productivity growth during the pause between the age of steam and the age of 
electricity at the end of the Victorian era. 
9 Feinstein et al. (1982) argued that the climacteric in TFP growth came entirely from slower GDP growth 
rather than slower growth of total factor inputs so they were hypothesizing a fall in trend GDP growth. 
10 The idea of ‘failure’ has been hotly disputed in particular by McCloskey (1970). 
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tendency to some extent in terms of stronger TFP growth; if labour quality is included in labour 
inputs, TFP growth is now estimated to have been 0.41 per cent per year rather than 0.2 per cent.  
This represents faster TFP growth than at any time prior to 1850, which was not the case in the old 
estimates, and probably reflects a more modern economy whose growth capabilities were stronger 
and spread across more sectors of the economy than those of the early industrial-revolution days 
(Crafts, 2018a).  It should also be noted that TFP growth was 0.36 per cent per year and labour 
productivity growth was 0.66 per cent per year during the period 1929 to 1937 which was a much 
better outcome for the interwar crisis than the -0.77 per cent and 0.07 per cent, respectively, 
recorded during 2007 to 2016. 
On the basis of inter-temporal comparisons, then, productivity growth in the interwar economy now 
looks better than has hitherto been recognised.  It is also true that a comparison with the United 
States in the interwar period also looks a bit better partly because new research has revised 
downwards American TFP growth by taking fuller account of labour quality than was done by 
Kendrick (1961).  Whereas comparing Matthews et al. for 1924 to 1937 with Kendrick for 1919 to 
1941 showed UK TFP growth at 0.2 per cent versus US TFP growth at 2.16 per cent per year, the new 
estimates are 0.41 per cent for the UK compared with 1.76 per cent per year for the United States 
according to Bakker et al. (2019).  That said, UK productivity growth is still a long way below the 
American level and this remains a big caveat on optimistic interpretations of interwar British 
performance. 
The standard narrative for the European golden age after World War II is that UK economic growth 
was the fastest in its economic history but that the UK did not take advantage of the opportunity for 
rapid catch-up growth as well as its European peer group so its productivity grew more slowly.  
Policy errors and the institutional legacy undermined economic growth in this period (Crafts, 2018a). 
While there was greater scope for catch-up in other countries on account of larger initial 
productivity gaps with the United States and their growth was augmented by reconstruction and a 
structural shift out of agriculture (Temin, 2002), nevertheless UK failure was evidenced by being 
overtaken, i.e., falling behind the European in terms of productivity levels during the golden age. 
The new estimates which show faster TFP and labour productivity growth between 1950 and 1973 
(2.44 versus 2.1 per cent per year and 3.74 versus 3.3 per cent per year, respectively) change the 
details of this comparison but not the main conclusion.  As is reported in Table 4, there is still a 
substantial shortfall of productivity growth compared with France and West Germany and those 
countries are still estimated to have higher labour productivity levels in 1973, by 12.6 and 11.9 per 
cent, respectively. 
The estimates reported in this paper provide an interesting historical perspective on recent 
productivity performance.  The years after 2007 have the lowest TFP growth of any period reported 
in Table 3 and the worst labour productivity growth since the 18th century.  On top of this, what is 
truly remarkable is the fall in productivity growth since the pre-crisis years when it was very 
respectable by historical standards.  Comparing 1995 to 2007, we see that TFP growth fell by 1.68 
8 
 
and labour productivity by 2.01 percentage points per year.11  This is completely unprecedented; the 
Edwardian climacteric is not in the same league. 
5. Conclusions 
The first significant historical growth accounting studies for the UK appeared in the early 1980s.  
Work by Feinstein (1981) on the industrial revolution period was quickly superseded but the much 
more ambitious study by Matthews et al. (1982) covering 1856 to 1973 remains a standard 
reference point in the literature.  Since then, however, there have been many improvements to the 
available data which cumulatively lead to a picture of long run growth performance that is 
significantly different in a number of ways. 
Matthews et al. (1982) described U-shaped productivity growth over the long run with the low point 
in the early 20th century.  Now the picture seems to be one of twin peaks in productivity growth 
about a hundred years apart, in the third quarters of the 19th and 20th centuries. The bottom of the U 
was seen in the sister publication by Feinstein et al. (1982) as an Edwardian climacteric which has 
sometimes been seen as a precursor to the current productivity puzzle.  Using more recent data, the 
Edwardian productivity decline seems a good deal less severe and the post-2007 slowdown seems 
quite unprecedented. 
Inter-temporal comparisons have now changed somewhat and in some respects give very different 
results from what someone unfamiliar with the data might believe.  Notably, labour productivity 
growth in the alleged Victorian failure of the late-19th century far exceeded that in the classic 
Industrial Revolution years of the late-18th and early-19th century while labour productivity growth in 
the late-20th century matched the best performance of the ‘workshop of the world’ in the mid-
Victorian boom. 
In two key episodes of British economic growth we now have distinctly different estimates for 
productivity growth compared with those made a generation ago – much slower during the 
Industrial Revolution but appreciably faster during the Golden Age.  That said, current mainstream 
interpretations will only need to be revised in terms of detail.  The Industrial Revolution can still be 
seen as a gradual transition to modern economic growth and the Golden Age is still a period when 
UK productivity performance compared unfavourably with the European peer group. 
  
                                                          
11 It is possible that measurement issues play some part in the recent dramatic productivity slowdown.  This is 
an issue on which further research is desirable but at the moment it appears that the slowdown is for the most 
part not a statistical artefact (Crafts, 2018b). 
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Table 1.  Growth Accounting Estimates, 1700-2016 (% per year) 
a) From the Early 1980s 
 ΔY/Y ΔK/K ΔL/L Δ(Y/L)/ 
(Y/L) 
Capital 
Deepening 
TFP 
1761-1800 1.1 1.0 0.8 0.3 0.1 0.2 
1801-1830 2.7 1.4 1.4 1.3 0.0 1.3 
1831-1860 2.5 2.0 1.4 1.1 0.3 0.8 
1856-1873 2.2 1.9 0.0 2.2 0.8 1.4 
1873-1913 1.8 1.9 0.9 0.9 0.4 0.5 
1924-1937 2.2 1.8 1.5 0.7 0.1 0.6 
1951-1973 2.8 3.9 -0.5 3.3 1.2 2.1 
 
Notes: α = 0.5 in 1761-1860, 0.41 in 1856-73, 0.43 in 1873-1913, 0.3 in 1924-37 and 0.27 in 1951-73; 
K is gross capital pre-1951 and net capital thereafter, L is employment pre-1856 and hours worked 
thereafter. 
Sources: Feinstein (1981), Matthews et al. (1982). 
b) Based on the Millennium Spreadsheet 
 ΔY/Y ΔK/K ΔL/L Δ(Y/L)/ 
(Y/L) 
Capital 
Deepening 
TFP 
1700-1760 0.67 0.67 0.42 0.25 0.10 0.15 
1760-1780 0.85 0.70 0.86 -0.01 -0.06 0.05 
1780-1800 1.48 1.50 1.02 0.46 0.19 0.27 
1800-1830 1.62 1.59 1.33 0.29 0.10 0.19 
1830-1856 2.36 3.00 1.15 1.11 0.65 0.46 
1856-1873 2.38 2.38 0.32 2.06 0.72 1.34 
1873-1913 1.86 1.90 0.80 1.06 0.38 0.68 
1924-1937 2.13 0.63 1.43 0.70 -0.20 0.90 
1950-1973 3.36 4.36 -0.38 3.74 1.30 2.44 
1973-1995 1.98 3.43 -0.20 2.18 0.91 1.27 
1995-2007 2.88 4.27 0.80 2.08 0.87 1.21 
2007-2016 0.95 2.34 0.88 0.07 0.36 -0.29 
 
Notes: α = 0.40 in 1700-1830, 0.35 in 1830-1913, 0.25 in 1924-37, 0.275 in 1950-73, 0.25 in 1973-
2016; K is net capital, L is hours worked. 
Source: derived from Thomas and Dimsdale (2017) using Table A55 Cols W, X and AM for capital 
inputs, Tables A50 Col B and A54 Cols F and AW for labour inputs, Table A8 Col B for real GDP, and 
Table A56 Col B for factor shares. 
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Table 2. Growth Accounting Estimates for the Early 20th Century Slowdown (% per year) 
a) From the Early 1980s 
 ΔY/Y ΔK/K ΔL/L Δ(Y/L)/ 
(Y/L) 
Capital 
Deepening 
TFP 
1856-73 2.2 2.0 0.9 1.3 0.5  0.8 
       
1873-82 1.9 2.4 0.6 1.3 0.7  0.6 
1882-89 2.2 1.6 1.1 1.2 0.3  0.9 
1889-99 2.2 1.8 1.1 1.1 0.3  0.8 
1899-1907 1.2 2.4 0.7 0.5 0.8 -0.3 
1907-13 1.6 1.4 1.1 0.4 0.1  0.3 
       
1873-99 2.1 2.0 0.9 1.2 0.5  0.7 
1899-1913 1.4 2.0 0.9 0.5 0.5  0.0 
1924-37 2.2 1.8 1.5 0.7 0.1  0.6 
 
Notes: K is gross capital and L is employment. 
Source: Feinstein et al. (1982). 
b) Based on the Millennium Spreadsheet 
 ΔY/Y ΔK/K ΔL/L Δ(Y/L)/ 
(Y/L) 
Capital 
Deepening 
TFP 
1856-73 2.38 2.38 0.32 2.06 0.72  1.34 
       
1873-82 1.85 2.28 0.35 1.50 0.68  0.82 
1882-89 1.76 1.24 1.11 0.65 0.04  0.61 
1889-99 2.27 1.89 0.98 1.29 0.32  0.97 
1899-1907 1.50 2.81 0.82 0.68 0.69 -0.01 
1907-13 1.85 0.94 0.81 1.04 0.05  0.99 
       
1873-99 1.98 1.85 0.80 1.18 0.37  0.81 
1899-1913 1.65 2.00 0.81 0.84 0.42  0.42 
1924-37 2.13 0.63 1.43 0.70 -0.20  0.90 
 
Notes: K is net capital and L is hours worked. 
Source: Thomas and Dimsdale (2017) 
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Table 3. Growth Accounting Estimates with Millennium Spreadsheet allowing for Labour 
Quality, 1700-2016 (% per year) 
a) From the early 1980s 
 ΔY/Y ΔK/K ΔL/L ΔLQ/ 
LQ 
Δ(Y/L)/ 
(Y/L) 
Capital 
Deepening 
Human 
Capital 
Deepening 
TFP* 
1856-1873 2.2 1.9 0.0 1.4 2.2 0.8 0.8 0.6 
1873-1913 1.8 1.9 0.9 0.8 0.9 0.4 0.5 0.0 
1924-1937 2.2 1.8 1.5 0.6 0.7 0.1 0.4 0.2 
1951-1973 2.8 3.9 -0.5 0.6 3.3 1.2 0.4 1.7 
 
Notes: estimates from Table 1 adjusted to include labour quality growth in labour input.  Labour 
quality includes impact of changes in intensity of work but not occupational shifts. 
Source: Matthews et al. (1982) 
b) Based on Modern Data 
 ΔY/Y ΔK/K ΔL/L ΔLQ/ 
LQ 
Δ(Y/L)/ 
(Y/L) 
Capital 
Deepening 
Human 
Capital 
Deepening 
TFP* 
1700-1760 0.67 0.67 0.42 0.01 0.25 0.10 0.01 0.14 
1760-1780 0.85 0.70 0.86 -0.01 -0.01 -0.06 -0.01 0.06 
1780-1800 1.48 1.50 1.02 -0.02 0.46 0.19 -0.01 0.28 
1800-1830 1.62 1.59 1.33 0.01 0.29 0.10 0.01 0.18 
1830-1856 2.36 3.00 1.15 0.13 1.11 0.65 0.08 0.38 
1856-1873 2.38 2.38 0.32 0.50 2.06 0.72 0.32 1.02 
1873-1913 1.86 1.90 0.80 0.90 1.06 0.38 0.58 0.10 
1924-1937 2.13 0.63 1.43 0.65 0.70 -0.20 0.49 0.41 
1950-1973 3.36 4.36 -0.38 0.77 3.74 1.30 0.56 1.88 
1973-1995 1.98 3.43 -0.20 0.74 2.18 0.91 0.42 0.75 
1995-2007 2.88 4.27 0.80 0.40 2.08 0.87 0.30 0.91 
2007-2016 0.95 2.34 0.88 0.64 0.07 0.36 0.48 -0.77 
 
Notes: estimates from Table 1 adjusted to include labour quality growth in labour input.  Labour 
quality through 1856 is based only on years of schooling (de Pleijt, 2018) assuming a 6 per cent 
increase in labour quality per additional year, and for 1856 to 1973 is from Matthews et al. (1982) 
including the additional component for occupational shifts but excluding the impact of changes in 
intensity of work. 
Sources: derived from Bell et al. (2005), de Pleijt (2018), Matthews et al. (1982), ONS (2017), and 
Thomas and Dimsdale (2017) 
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Table 4. Comparative Productivity Performance in the Golden Age, 1950-1973 
a) Productivity Growth, 1950-73 (% per year) 
 Y/L TFP 
France 4.83 4.02 
UK 3.74 2.44 
West Germany 5.83 4.06 
 
Note: TFP is ‘crude TFP’. 
Sources: Table 1 and the long-term productivity database for Bergeaud et al. (2016). 
b) Real GDP/Hour Worked (UK =100 in each year) 
 France West Germany 
1950 80.3 70.0 
1973 112.6 111.9 
 
Note: GDP is measured in terms of 1990 Geary-Khamis dollars. 
Sources: derived from Thomas and Dimsdale (2017) and The Conference Board (2016) 
 
